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A COMPARISON OF THE LANDOWNER'S
RIGHTS TO PETROLEUM IN FRANCE AND
LOUISIANA
Harry S. Sachse*
p etroleum is a thing of such great importance and of such a
unique character that it has been the subject of new legis-
lation and of new rights wherever it has been found. It is the
object of this paper to compare the rights of landowners to
petroleum beneath their lands in France and in Louisiana.'
THE NATURE OF THE LANDOWNER'S RIGHT TO PETROLEUM
IN LOUISIANA
After being settled by the French and conquered by the
Spanish, Louisiana became an American Territory in 1803. In
1808, the territorial legislature adopted "A Digest of the Civil
Law Actually in Effect in the Territory of Orleans," which was,
in fact, the first Civil Code of Louisiana. It was partly original
and partly Spanish but much of it was taken from the pre-
liminary projets of the Code Napoleon. In 1825 after the terri-
tory had become a state the legislature adopted a new Civil
Code which borrowed much more heavily from the Code Na-
poleon, which was by then celebrated throughout the world.
The Code Napoleon and all of the Louisiana Codes, including
the revision of 1870, provided that:
"Perfect ownership gives the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing in the most absolute manner, provided it is not
used in any way prohibited by law.
"No one can be constrained to cede his property unless
for some purpose of public utility and on consideration of an
equitable and previous indemnity.''2
These articles establish in general the powers enjoyed by the
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar. Mr. Sachse's article is based on a Memoire
presented by him to the Institute of Comparative Law, University of Paris as
part of the requirements for a diploma in comparative law.
1. By petroleum is understood all liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons.
2. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 491, 497 (1870) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 483, 489
(1825); LA. CIVIL CODE Ch. 1, tit. 2, arts. 1, 2 (1808); FRENCH CIVIL CODE
arts. 544, 545.
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owner of a thing, but do not establish the extent of the thing
owned. Article 9, Chapter I, Title II of the Digest of 1808 pro-
vided:
"The ownership of the soil carries with it the ownership
of that which is above it and under it. The owner may make
upon it all the plantations and constructions which he thinks
proper, save the exceptions established under the title of
servitudes and real services.
"He may construct below the soil all manner of works
and pits which he thinks proper and draw from them all the
profits that they can produce subject to the modifications
resulting from the regulations of police."
This article, which states in so many words that ownership
of the surface of land includes all that is under it, differs in
one important respect from the corresponding article of the
Code Napoleon. 3 The Digest of 1808 limited the rights of the
surface owner only by the regulations of police. The article of
the Code Napoleon contained an additional limitation as to
"modifications resulting from the laws and regulations relative
to mines." In 1808, there were neither mines nor mineral laws
in Louisiana. Thus, this limitation was meaningless and was
not included. For the same reasons one does not find in the
Digest of 1808 an article equivalent to Article 598 of the Code
Napoleon which regulates the rights of the usufructuary to the
products of mines and quarries.
In the Code of 1825, a curious change was made. Article 497,
the former Article 9, was made substantially identical to Ar-
ticle 552 of the Code Napoleon. That is to say, the right of the
surface proprietor to the sub-surface was limited not only by
the regulations of police but also by the "Laws and Regulations
Relative to Mines." In the projet of the Code of 1825, the redac-
tors commented: "The only amendment in this article is rela-
tive to that which is said on mines of which our Code did not
speak." This reference to a nonexistent law of mines was re-
tained in Article 505 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870.
The Code of 1825 also added an article (Article 545, now
Article 552) tracking the language of the Code Napoleon which
gives a usufructuary the right to exploit mines and quarries
already in exploitation. The Code of 1825 did not, however,
3. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 552.
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contain the Code Napoleon's reference to the necessity of ob-
taining the permission of the state for such exploitation. The
redactors made no comment on this new article. It is known
that the redactors contemplated a commercial code which has
never been adopted. From these two articles, one must suppose
that they also contemplated mineral legislation outside of the
Civil Code in the event that a mineral industry should develop.
Such legislation existed in France at that time.
Oil was discovered in Pennsylvania in 1859 and soon after-
wards in many other states. As early as 1870 a question of
an infraction of the terms of a mineral lease was presented to
the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Escoubas v. Louisiana Petro-
leum & Coal Co.4 But petroleum was not produced in Louisiana
until 1901 and it was in 1913 that the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana first ruled on the nature of the landowner's right to
petroleum. 5 Despite the warning of future problems given by
the Escoubas case and despite the obvious and intentional in-
adequacy of the Civil Code in mineral matters, the Louisiana
legislature gave the courts no assistance regarding the juridical
nature of interests in petroleum or the legal forms under which
the exploration and exploitation of petroleum could be made.
The entire matter was left to judicial interpretation of statutes
never designed to regulate the matters at issue.
In this period of dormancy in Louisiana, there was a lively
development of petroleum law in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
New Jersey, and several other petroleum-producing states. It
is not surprising to find that this development outside of Lou-
isiana had an important effect on Louisiana mineral law. Two
conclusions of this early petroleum law were of paramount im-
portance: first, that the rights to petroleum were private and
not public; and, secondly, that these private rights might not
go as far as ownership.
The government of the United States, contrary to the govern-
ments of European nations, never claimed a proprietary right
to petroleum or solid minerals found under private property.
Similarly, the states, although they have often taxed the right
4. 22 La. Ann. 280 (1870).
5. Wadkins v. Atlanta & Shreveport Oil & Gas Co. (1913). This case was
not officially published because, during a delay for rehearing, the case was com-
promised by the parties. 150 La. 756, 770, 91 So. 307, 212 (1922).
Curiously, despite an important development of salt and sulphur mines, no
body of legislation or jurisprudence had been developed in relation to such activi-
ties.
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to extract minerals or the value of minerals extracted from the
ground and have regulated the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum, have never claimed a proprietary right to petroleum
under private property. This is without doubt attributable to
the American repugnance to governmental ownership of basic
industry, an aversion which was even stronger in the forma-
tive period of petroleum law than now. Private rights to petro-
leum seem unusual to Europeans but the development of such
rights was fostered by nineteenth cenutry conditions in America.
Even though petroleum had a great value in the nineteenth
century as a source of illumination and for the production of
carbon, that value was without the national importance that
petroleum gained during the First World War when the internal
combustion engine became a tool of warfare. Petroleum was
discovered in the United States during a period of economic
laissez-faire and governmental weakness. The federal govern-
ment lacked the political power to claim ownership of petroleum
under private property. The states, on the other hand, without
international obligations and before the period of social wel-
fare legislation and of federal income tax, having sufficient
powers of taxation, had no reason to claim the ownership of
minerals which at that time in any event would have been
politically impossible. It is beyond the limits of this paper to
do more than indicate some of the conditions that led to a tacit
acceptance of the view that petroleum is not part of the public
domain. This was implicitly recognized without being the sub-
ject of legislation or jurisprudential decision. The point is im-
portant because the legal analyses of many of the early cases
if delivered in a different political situation could have led to
a conclusion that oil and gas are not susceptible of private
ownership and thus are at the disposition of the state.
The common law which was the fundamental law of all the
early petroleum states recognized, as did the French law, in
principle, that the surface proprietor is the proprietor of all
above and below the surface. It further recognized his owner-
ship of all the minerals under his land and his right to dispose
of them in creating a separate estate in a mine, or to contract
liberally for the exploitation of the minerals. 6 A mineral lease
was the habitual way of providing for exploitation.
6. 1, SNYDER, MINES AND MINING § 7 (1902). See also 36 AM. JuR., Mines
and minerals, 284, 285, 297 (1941). With certain exceptions, particularly as to
gold and silver mines.
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The judges of the first American cases ruling on the rights
to petroleum were impressed by the difference between petro-
leum and solid minerals. It was recognized that a well drilled
in one tract of land may be able to drain petroleum from be-
neath an adjoining tract, and that it would be very difficult,
if not impossible, to know the source of the petroleum extracted.
Additionally, it was generally thought that petroleum flowed
in underground rivers, as is often the case with water. The
courts, mindful of the difference between petroleum and solid
minerals, searched for a juridical guide beyond the law of tradi-
tional mining. One guide was found in an analogy with flowing
springs of water and water wells. The English case of Acton v.
Blundell had established that a surface owner could drill a water
well on his property which dried the well of his neighbor with-
out owing reparation to the neighbor for the damage done.7
This case was often cited in American mineral cases."
A second and more curious analogy was made to wild
animals-animals ferae naturae. The analogy was first made
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which stated that:
"Water and oil and still more strongly gas, may be classi-
fied by themselves, if the analogy is not too fanciful, as min-
erals ferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike
other minerals, they have the power and tendency to escape
without the volition of the owner. Their 'fugitive and wan-
dering existence within the limits of a particular tract was
uncertain' . . . They belong to the owner of the land, and
are part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject
to his control; but when they escape, and go into other land,
or come under another's control, the title of the former owner
is gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily
possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant,
owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes
into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but
his."9
The result of the two analogies was a theory usually referred
to as that of nonownership, the principle of which was that the
7. Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843). The
same result is had in France. See 1 PLANIOL, TRAITIt tL]tMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
no 3124 (5th ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL].
8. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 36 (1959).
9. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249, 18
Atl. 724, 725 (1889).
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landowner is not the owner of the petroleum under his land as
it is a fugacious thing and not subject to ownership, but that he
has the exclusive right to prospect and drill wells on his land
and to retain all the petroleum that he can extract through such
wells, whether it is drawn from the subsurface of his land or his
neighbors'. He can dispose of his right so to do in any manner
he wishes, perpetually or otherwise.
With the discovery that petroleum is less fugacious than had
been previously thought, and that it usually rests trapped in
reservoirs until the reservoirs are tapped by man,' many states,
finding less reason to distinguish petroleum from solid minerals
and finding the analogies to wild animals and to springs of wa-
ter too remote, classified petroleum with solid minerals as an
estate that may be owned separately from the soil. This classi-
fication was called the theory of ownership or ownership in
place. Despite the new classification the conclusion of the prin-
ciple of nonownership that one may draw all the oil he can from
wells on his land without indemnification to his neighbors was
retained. This concept, common to the two theories, was called
the rule of capture. Since both theories incorporate this impor-
tant rule, one can see that the difference between the two the-
ories is more a question of form and terminology than of sub-
stance.
The states classifying petroleum with solid minerals justified
the rule of capture in a fashion similar to that of the following
decision of a Texas court:
"We do not regard it as an open question in this state that
gas and oil in place are minerals and realty, subject to own-
ership, severance, and sale while imbedded in the sands or
rocks beneath the earth's surface, in like manner and to the
same extent as is coal or any other solid mineral.
"The objection lacks substantial foundation that gas or
oil in a certain tract of land cannot be owned in place, be-
cause subject to appropriation, without the consent of the
owner of the tract, through drainage from wells on adjacent
land. If the owners of adjacent lands have the right to ap-
propriate, without liability, the gas and oil underlying their
neighbor's land, then their neighbor has the correlative right
to appropriate, through like methods of drainage, the gas and
10. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 104 (1959).
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oil underlying the tracts adjacent to this own .... Ultimate
injury from the net results of drainage, where proper dili-
gence is used, is altogether too conjectural to form the basis
for the denial of a right of property in that which is not only
plainly as much realty as any other part of the earth's con-
tents, but realty of the highest value to mankind and often
worth far more than anything else on or beneath the surface
within the proprietor's boundaries .... We do not think that
any distinction in principle lies between the title acquired
under a grant of solid minerals and the title acquired under
a grant in the same form of gas and oil.""
In addition to the rule of ownership and of nonownership and
outside of the rule of capture, a third thesis was expounded, the
theory of correlative rights. Each surface proprietor above a
petroleum reservoir is recognized to have a right to participate
in the benefits of the reservoir. Thus, no single proprietor
should be permitted to exhaust the reservoir or to extract more
than his proper portion. This is the theory of Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, in which the United States Supreme Court in 1900 up-
held one of the early conservation laws which had been attacked
as a deprivation of private property. The Court stated:
"[A]s to gas and oil, the surface proprietors within the
gas field all have the right to reduce to possession the gas
and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely deprived of
this right which belongs to them without the taking of pri-
vate property. But there is a coequal right in them all to
take from a common source of supply, the two substances
which in the nature of things are united though separate.
It follows from the essence of their right and from the situa-
tion of the things as to which it can be exerted, that the use
by one of his power to seek to convert a part of the common
fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion
being attributed to one of the possessors of the right to the
detriment of the others, or by waste by one or more to the
annihilation of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that
the legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the right
and objects upon which it is to be exerted, can be manifested
for the purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by
securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment, by
them, of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach
11. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 167, 254
S.W. 290, 292 (1923).
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the like end by preventing waste .... Viewed, then, as a
statute to protect or to prevent the waste of the common
property of the surface owners, the law of the State of In-
diana which is here attacked because it is asserted that it
divested private property without due compensation, in sub-
stance, is a statute protecting private property and prevent-
ing it from being taken by one of the common owners without
regard to the enjoyment of the others.' 1 2
Despite the language that petroleum reservoirs are the
common property of the surface owners, the Ohio case was
generally misinterpreted as a recognition of the theory of non-
ownership. The validity of conservation legislation was thus
erroneously assumed to be dependent upon the theory of non-
ownership which was thereby preserved for some time against
the erosive effects of new geological discoveries and the dissent
of the Supreme Courts of several states. The rule of capture was
not yet to be abolished.
Such was the mineral law known by the Louisiana judges at
the time of the discovery of petroleum in Louisiana. Louisiana
had no mineral code. The Civil Code gave only the most meager
consideration to problems of mineral law, and no jurisprudence
had been developed on the subject. The only guide readily avail-
able was the development in the common law states, but there
the basic property law was alien and confusing to the Louisiana
jurist.
The Louisiana courts accepted without question that the land-
owner has paramount rights to the petroleum under his surface.
The first and most basic problem to be considered was whether
a landowner could dispose of the petroleum under his land per-
manently, creating a separate estate in minerals distinct from
the surface ownership. In 1913, the question arose in the follow-
ing now familiar context: a surface owner entered into an act
purporting to convey all the minerals under his land, including
petroleum, to an oil company. For more than ten years the oil
company made no effort towards exploitation of the minerals.
Then the company began drilling and the surface owner object-
ed. His argument was that he had never been owner of the
petroleum under his land because it was a thing without master.
He urged that he only owned an exclusive right to search for the
petroleum and to exploit it if he could find it, and it was this
12. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900).
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right and not the petroleum itself that the company had bought
from him. Since the company had not exercised its right during
ten years, the landowner maintained that the right had pre-
scribed. The court decided for the landowner.' 3 The case was
never reported as it was settled pending a rehearing and the
question remained without a definitive solution until 1923 when
the principle of the Wadkins case was confirmed in the case of
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs.14
All of the early Louisiana mineral cases fully recognized the
rule of capture which was then well established in the common
law states. In the Wadkins case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
had reported that there was nothing to the contrary in the
French law, the law of springs of water being applicable to all
liquid minerals. The first oil or gas well at that time was yet to
be drilled in France. The court also accepted the geological con-
clusions that petroleum moves without human intervention over
an extended area and that a well may produce petroleum drawn
from an indefinite distance. From these two premises, the con-
clusion seemed to follow that petroleum is a thing without mas-
ter, and not susceptible of private ownership before being ex-
tracted. This being so, a sale of the oil and gas under a tract of
land could only be a sale of the right to look for and extract it.
Being a right, and not the ownership of a thing, it would pre-
scribe by non-usage during 10 years.15 The right was character-
ized as a servitude, but not without difficulty. Under the Lou-
isiana Civil Code, servitudes are either praedial (charges im-
posed upon one estate for the benefit of another estate) or per-
sonal (charges imposed upon an estate for the benefit of an in-
dividual). Personal servitudes are limited by the Civil Code to
the institutions of usufruct, use, and habitation, all of which
terminate with the life of the person in whose favor they are
13. Wadkins v. Atlanta & Shreveport Oil & Gas Co. (1913).
14. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922). In the interval there was a series of
cases suggesting the position ultimately to be taken in the Frost-Johnon case.
See Higgens Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919) ;
Hanby v. Texas Co., 140 La. 189, 72 So. 933 (1916); Saunders v. Busch-
Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1916); Strother v. Mangham, 138 La.
437, 70 So. 426 (1915); Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914);
Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914); Rives v. Gulf
Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
15. LA. CIviI CODE art. 3544 (1870) : "In general, all personal actions, ex-
cept those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years." Id. art. 3546: "The
right of usufruct, use and habitation and servitudes are lost by non-use for ten
years." In France, the non-usage must be of thirty years. FRENCH CIVIL. CODE
arts. 617, 625, 2262.
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established. 16 Because of this limitation it is impractical to clas-
sify the right to petroleum as a personal servitude. The expenses
involved in searching for and producing petroleum are too great
for the right to produce petroleum to be governed by such an
uncertain period as the life of a man. On the other hand, the
right to oil and gas does not fit neatly into the definition of a
praedial servitude, because there are not two separate estates
involved in any normal meaning of the word.
Despite these difficulties, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
the Frost-Johnson case declared the right to oil and gas to be a
hereditary servitude imposed upon an estate for the benefit of
an individual. As a servitude, it was declared to be lost by pre-
scription if not exercised for ten years.
The court was not unanimous in rendering this decision. The
dissenting judges criticized the opinion as being founded on the
false geological premise that petroleum is fugative while in fact
it is trapped in reservoirs where it rests indefinitely if no one
drills a well by which it may escape.
As stated by Justice Provosty:
"Will it seriously be said that the system of laws which
recognizes ownership in things so light of wing as birds and
bees, and so fleet of movement as fish, and of so trifling
value, denies ownership to a substance so infinitely less mo-
bile as oil, and so valuable that its possession is now threat-
ening to become the apple of discord between the nations of
the earth.'17
The minority further objected that the case is founded on a
false application of the Civil Code. The argument was made that
to find a servitude the subsurface should be considered the domi-
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870) : "All servitudes which affect lands may
be divided into two kinds, personal and real.
"Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for whose benefit they
are established, and terminate with his life. This kind of servitude is of three
sorts: usufruct, use and habitation.
"Real servitudes, which are also called predial or landed servitudes, are those
which the owner of an estate enjoys on a neighboring estate for the benefit of
his own estate.
"They are called predial or landed servitudes, because, being established for
the benefit of an estate, they are rather due to the estate than to the owner
personally."
See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 617, 625.
- .17. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 803, 91 So.
207, 224 (1922).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
nant estate and the surface the servient estate, owing to the
subsurface whatever right of occupation or passage may be
necessary for the exploitation of petroleum. The servitude, then,
would be one which originates from the situation of the places
and imprescriptible.15
Lastly, the minority judges objected that as petroleum is
often the most valuable part of the estate, the owner of the estate
should have the right to sell it perpetually if he so desires. They
reasoned that if the Civil Code does not permit a sale of minerals
it is simply because the problem was not posed at the time of its
redaction and concluded that since the other states permit the
sale of petroleum in perpetuity and such would be commercially
useful in Louisiana, the court should declare its legality.
The context in which the question was posed shows that the
court, in establishing the principle of servitude for mineral
rights, may have thought primarily of finding a way of applying
the prescription of ten years to a separation of ownership of the
surface and subsurface. A certain inquietude concerning the
perpetual sale of minerals was not without foundation. Oil com-
panies in other states had speculated widely in purchasing per-
petual mineral rights in undeveloped areas at low prices and
without immediate plans for exploration. If there had been no
petroleum development in a region, these mineral rights of an
immense potential value could be bought cheaply from the land-
owners who were often uninformed farmers, not aware of the
value of their rights. The necessity to begin exploration within
ten years or lose the mineral lease would at least curb this prac-
tice, and would also free many landowners from improvident
sales of their rights.
Additionally, a ten-year prescriptive period on mineral rights
would encourage the oil companies to search for oil and begin
exploitation as soon as possible, so as not to lose their rights.
This necessity on the part of the oil company, together with the
rule of capture which encouraged the landowner to exploit his
land so that the oil would not be drawn from it by a neighbor,
would create a system in which production of oil is encouraged
to the benefit of the landowners of the state and the state itself.
The ten-year prescriptive period would also serve to simplify
18. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 795 (1870) : "Prescription for non-usage
does not take place against natural or necessary servitudes, which originate from
the situation of places." One does not find a corresponding article in the French
Civil Code.
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questions of ownership of mineral interests. It is often difficult
enough to find the proper owners of a tract of land without hav-
ing to look for the heirs of holders of fractional interests in
minerals which might have been purchased years before as a
speculation and forgotten long before production was actually
obtained. Louisiana, situated in the midst of numerous common
law states with complicated property laws, has always been care-
ful to preserve the simplicity of its system of ownership. 19
Following the Frost-Johnson case, the Supreme Court rig-
orously applied the prescription of ten years to mineral rights
separated from the ownership of the land. The articles of the
Civil Code governing servitudes have been applied with some
modification and distortion to questions of petroleum rights,20
but the court has been less faithful to the servitude theory when
matters of prescriptibility have not been at issue. This was dem-
onstrated in 1934 in the case of Federal Land Bank v. Mulhern.21
The surface owner had mortgaged his land to the Federal
Land Bank under a mortgage that prohibited him from depre-
ciating the value of the land. After granting the mortgage, the
owner granted a mineral lease and the lessee began drilling op-
erations. The Land Bank objected that granting the mineral
lease depreciated the value of the land subject to the mortgage.
The mortgagor's position was that since oil and gas under the
land did not form a part of the land his lease could not depre-
ciate the value of the land, a position which seemed sound in
light of the Frost-Johnson case. The court held that while petro-
leum is not susceptible of ownership apart from the land be-
fore being separated from the land, it does form a part of the
land itself and the owner, after agreeing in his mortgage not to
depreciate the value of the land, had no right to allow the petro-
leum to be removed. 22
19. This care has led Louisiana to be more strict than France in certain
matters regarding division of ownership of property. For example, in Louisiana
but not in France payment of the purchase price cannot be made a suspensive
condition in the sale of movables and for a long time, such a condition was also
prohibited in the sale of immovables. See Comment, 2 LA. L. REv. 338 (1940).
20. For example, a mineral servitude is indivisible in the sense that the
exercise of the servitude on one part of the land subject to the servitude preserves
it on the entirety of the land. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38
(1931). The mineral servitude is extinguished when the dominant and servient
estates are united in the same hand. Arent v. Hunter, 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157
(1931).
21. Federal Land Dank v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So. 370 (1934).
22. Id. at 634, 157 So. at 373: "While the owner of land does not own the
fugitive minerals, such as oil and gas, beneath its surface, but only the right
to reduce them to possession and ownership, and while such minerals are not sus-
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During the period in which the court most uniformly stated
that the surface owner is not the owner of the petroleum beneath
his land, the rights of the surface owner to such petroleum were
great and closely resembled ownership. The surface owner alone
could search for or exploit petroleum, cede his rights to another
or refuse to do any of these, and all of this could be done with-
out the consent of the state and without regard to the rights of
other parties. Further, the prescription of a mineral right sep-
arated from the land was more often to the advantage of the
owner than to his disadvantage. In effect, the petroleum beneath
his land was his so long as he could protect it from extraction
by his neighbors.
The Roman jurists separated the attributes of ownership of
a thing into the right to use it (usus), to enjoy its products
(fructus), and to dispose of it (abusus). As a further analysis,
later writers added the right to transmit the thing (jus trans-
mittendi), and the right to prohibit its use (jus prohibendi) .23
In Louisiana, the surface owner had the full rights of usus and
fructus of the minerals beneath his land. He had the right of
abusus in that he could destroy the petroleum insofar as his
physical means permitted. The real limitations were in the right
to transmit and the right to prohibit use, for the property could
only be transmitted for ten years without production or efforts
in good faith to obtain production; and, if the landowner did
not use his petroleum, the law did not protect him from drainage
by his neighbor.
Protection from drainage could be costly and wasteful. It
might be necessary for a landowner to drill wells near the bound-
aries of his land solely to protect the mineral pool from drainage
by a neighbor's wells. The spectacle of two wells drilled nearly
side by side and separated by a property line was not rare. The
race to extract oil could be wasteful. To drill too many wells and
produce petroleum too fast can reduce the pressure of a reservoir
before it has a chance to drive the minerals to the surface and
the maximum quantity of petroleum may thus not be obtained.
ceptible of ownership apart from the land (Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's
Heirs, 150 La. 756 . . .), yet those minerals, while in place in the ground beneath
the surface, unsevered, are real estate, a part of the land itself, a part of the
realty, as much so as timber, coal, iron and salt . . . . A lease granted by the
owner of land for the development of the property for oil and gas is, in a sense,
a conveyance of the mineral rights, an alienation of a part of his interest in the
land, a dismemberment of the realty."
23. POsTE, G,.us, INSTITUTIONS 128 (4th ed. 1904).
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In a similar fashion the owner of a gas well on the edge of an
oil reservoir by producing gas of a low value can destroy the
pressure for the entire reservoir and render much more valuable
oil inexploitable for many other owners.
The rule of capture obviously led to waste. Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana concerned an attempt in the nineteenth century by the
government of Indiana to limit one of the most obvious sorts of
wastefulness, the loss of pressure through open and abandoned
wells. In 1906, Louisiana began to prohibit the same sort of
wastefulness.24 In 1924, the Louisiana legislature passed its first
modern oil and gas conservation law.25 This law prohibited wells
from being placed within a certain distance of each other, estab-
lished a common market for petroleum in the state, and provided
for governmental determination of the amount of petroleum that
could be taken from each well. The allowable amount depended
upon the market for petroleum and, at least in principle, the
perimeter the well could drain. With such a radical departure
from the rule of capture under which a landowner could drill
wherever he wished and extract as much petroleum as he wished,
it is not surprising that the constitutionality of the statute was
attacked. Its constitutionality was upheld by the state courts
on the ground that oil and gas are not susceptible to private own-
ership until extracted and that, therefore, no one has the right
to complain if he is not allowed to extract it. The federal courts
then upheld the act on the additional ground that petroleum is an
important natural resource and it is within the police power of
the state to regulate its production.2 6 The effect of the second
case, which relied on certain language of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
was to dispel the idea that conservation statutes could only be
upheld under a theory of nonownership of petroleum. Obviously,
the state should have the right to insure the orderly production
of one of its most valuable resources whether that resource is
susceptible of private ownership or not.
In 1940, a new comprehensive conservation statute was
passed which established the regime of conservation presently
in effect.2 7 It deprives the landowner of much of his freedom in
24. See La. Acts 1906, No. 71, §§ 1-5; 1910, Nos. 172, 190. See also Comment,
16 TUL. L. 11Ev. 199 (1941).
* 25. La. Acts 1924, No. 252.
26. The first reason was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in
State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co., 162 La. 165, 110 So. 188 (1926) ; the second by
a federal district court in Lilly v. Conservation Commissioner of Louisiana, 29
F. Supp. 892 (E.D. La. 1939).
27. La. Acts 1940, No. 157, now LA. R.S. tit. 30 (1950).
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the production of petroleum, but at the same time it to a great
extent recognizes the surface owner as the owner of the petro-
leum beneath his land .2  The courts of Louisiana have continued
to speak of petroleum as not being susceptible of private owner-
ship and have continued to classify the right to petroleum as a
servitude, but the Conservation Act greatly limited the rule of
capture which was the basis of the theory of nonownership and
servitude.
The objectives of the act were threefold: To assure that the
resources of the state would not be physically wasted; to pro-
hibit economic waste caused by over-production; and to assure
to each landowner his equitable part of the production of the
common source of petroleum that may underlie his land and the
land of others.2 9 This third objective of the act is the very nega-
tion of the rule of capture and the recognition of the doctrine of
correlative rights if not the ownership of petroleum in place.3 0
The equitable part of the production is essentially:
"That part of the authorized production of the pool . ..
which is substantially in the proportion that the quantity of
recoverable oil and gas in the developed area of his tract or
tracts in the pool bears to the recoverable oil and gas in the
total developed area of the pool insofar as these amounts can
be practically ascertained."'31
This quantity is usually determined by a proportion between the
superficial area the landowner owns over the pool and the
amount of the production that may be obtained from the pool.
Thus, in Louisiana, as the United States Supreme Court had
suggested in the Ohio Oil case, each landowner has a correlative
right in the reservoir partially located beneath his land. Despite
the possibility of extracting all the petroleum in the reservoir
28. LA. R.S. 30:9D (1950).
29. See La. Acts 1940, No. 157, §§ 2, 3, 9. See also DAGOETT, MINERAL RIGHTS
IN LOUISIANA 406-494 (rev. ed. 1949).
30. The substance of the law and the operation of the Commission, if it thus
may be simplified, is the following: No well may be drilled without the prior
permission of the Commissioner. This permission will always be given unless
the proposed well would be so close to an existing well or a well already au-
thorized that the new well would not be useful to the exploration and exploita-
tion of the reservoir. As wells are drilled, the Commissioner, with the aid of a
public hearing at which all interested parties may appear and be heard, deter-
mines the area which can be drained by each well. Each landowner or holder of
a mineral right is charged with a proportionate part of the cost of the unit well
and receives a proportionate part of the production.
31. LA. R.S. 30:9D (1950).
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by a well drilled on his land, he does not have a right to all the
petroleum in the reservoir. He only has a right to the quantity
of petroleum probably existing under his land before the reser-
voir is disturbed by man. Thus one must say that his right is
not to extract by means of a well on his land all the petroleum
that he can. He has only the right, as would be the case with a
solid mineral, to extract the mineral, or at least a quantity equal
to the mineral which is found under his land. This is the de-
scription of a right of ownership much more complete than that
granted to the landowner in states that adopt the principle of
ownership of oil reservoirs, but that lack a similar conservation
statute, because not only is the ownership of the surface pro-
prietor to the oil under his land recognized but it is protected by
the state against anyone who should attempt to violate it. Under
the conservation statute the landowner's rights of usus and fruc-
tus are limited but the jus prohibendi is returned to him.
The nature of the landowner's right, however, remains enig-
matic. Under the present Conservation Act, the ferae naturae
theory that petroleum is not susceptible of private ownership is
hardly tenable. Yet all the prescriptive limitations of servitudes
have been consistently applied to alienation of mineral rights.
The courts of Louisiana have not acknowledged the contradiction
between the regime of conservation and the principle of non-
ownership. It is clear, however, that the landowner's right to
petroleum beneath his land remains paramount; and here lies
the great difference from the French law.
THE NATURE OF THE LANDOWNER'S RIGHT TO PETROLEUM IN
FRANCE
Petroleum was produced in Alsace before the Franco-Prus-
sian war, but as a result of the treaty of peace of 1871, France
lost Alsace and its only oil field. They were not to be regained
until the end of World War I. The Alsatian field had been large-
ly exploited by pits and galleries of the type used in ordinary
coal mines and the legal problems in connection with it were
solved by reference to the laws governing ordinary mines.32 It
was only after World War I that a general search for petroleum
was begun in France and the necessity for special laws govern-
32. FEuR, LE R]tGIME JURIDIQUE DES RECHERCHES ET DE L'EXPLOITATION DES
OISEMENTS, DE PITROLE EN DROIT COMPAR]t 15 (Thesis Rennes 1939) [hereinafter
cited as FErnp] ;Desprairies, Evolution et principes de Droit Minier et des Hydro-
carbure8 en, France, 1 DROIT SOCIAL 2 (1956).
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ing rights to petroleum was felt. But oil and gas law in France
has never really been separate from the general mineral law.
The first article of the first petroleum legislation in France, the
law of December 16, 1922, classified petroleum as a mineral sub-
ject to concession by the state. That is to say that, except for
certain modifications, it was subjected to the laws governing
classical mines. Thus, to understand the nature of the land-
owner's right to petroleum in France, it is essential to study the
French law governing ordinary mines.
French mineral law antedates the Code Napoleon - and in
studying it one discovers that the French have had no less diffi-
culty in defining the nature of the right of the surface owner to
minerals than have the Louisiana courts. But the history of
French mineral law is concerned more with legislation than
with jurisprudence. Of more importance, the primary question
in France has not been to classify the paramount right the land-
owner has to the petroleum beneath his soil, but to determine
what right, if any, he does have.
Before the French Revolution, a mine on royal land could be
ceded by the King to an entrepeneur and the land retained by the
Crown, ceded to the entrepreneur with the mine, or separately
ceded to a third party. The mine constituted a separate estate.
On private land, a mine was prima facie the property of the sur-
face owner but he could dispose of the mine separately from his
land.8 3 From the fifteenth century, French royalty tried to exact
a regalien right of one-tenth the production of mines and later
to transform the exploitation of mines into a royal monopoly
but without much success.3 4 Thus, at the time of the French
Revolution, mines were subject to private ownership and could
constitute estates separate from the surface.
When the Ancien Regime was ended by the French Revo-
tion, the duty of deciding what to do with mines fell upon the
Constituent Assembly. The opinion of the assembly, as could be
expected, was divided. Certain members wanted to attribute the
ownership of mines to the surface owners. Others thought that
mines should be owned by the first person to exploit them. Oth-
ers would give the mines to the state. The question, obviously,
was full of political implications. Mirabeau, the leader of the
33. SNYDER, MINES 5 (1902).
84. 1 PLANiOL, no 3095.
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element in favor of attributing ownership of the mines to the
state, said:
"Society has not created an ownership of the soil except
for its cultivation ... one may only regard as property those
objects of which society can guarantee the conservation ...
common interest and justice are the foundations of property,
they do not require that mines be accessories to the surface.
The interior of the earth is not susceptible of partition."35
Earlier, Tourgot had proposed that mines should be the prop-
erty of their first exploiter, who would acquire them by occupa-
tion. Certain of the Constituent Assembly followed his views.86
Mirabeau criticized this position as impracticable because of the
impossibility of determining the extent of a mineral vein once
it is discovered 7 The majority were satisfied to follow the law
of the Ancien Regime in declaring that a mine belongs to the
proprietor of the surface and that he may dispose of it or not as
he sees fit.
Two years after the fall of the Bastille and thirteen years be-
fore the promulgation of the Code Napoleon, the Constituent As-
sembly passed the law of 12 to 28 July, 1791, which was the first
mineral legislation of modern France and the first of several
compromises that would have to be made in the matter of min-
eral law. This law did not make a distinct determination of
whether minerals under the surface of privately-owned land ap-
pertained to the state, the proprietor of the surface, or the dis-
35. FEum 22: "La socidtd n'a fait une propridtd du sol qu'a la charge de la
culture. . . . On 'a pu regarder comme propridtd qu leas objets dont La socidtd
pouvait garantir la conservation. . . . L'intdrdt commune et ai justice sont les
fondements de la propidtd, its n'exigent pas que les mines soient le8 accessoires
de la surface. L'intdrieur de la terre n'est susceptible d'aucun portage."
36. Ibid.
37. How much will the person who discovers the mine own? Certainly he will
only have that which he has found. This vein of one hundred fathoms is his.
But if the vein has a thousand fathoms will the entire vein appertain to him
when he has not found its entirety?
"Quelle sera la propridtd de celui qui aura le premier touchd la mine? I
n'aura certainement que ce qu'il aura touch6. Ce filon de cent toisas est d lui.
Mais si le filon a mille toises, le filon Lu appartient-il en entier quoiqu'iL ne l'ait
pas trouvd en entier?" Id. at 22.
The truth of Mirabeau's observation as to the difficulty of determining the
extent of a vein is constantly illustrated at hearings before the Conservation Com-
mission in Louisiana.
For a recent variation of Mirabeau's problem, see Gueno v. Medlenka, 238
La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960) and King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So. 2d
326 (1961). Under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 552 (1870), if one well has been drilled
before the commencement of the usufruct, is it alone subject to the usufruct or
may the usufructuary drill other wells to the same pool? To other pools? See
Comments, 20 LA. L. REV. 773 (1960), 16 TUL. L. REV. 199 (1941).
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coverer of the minerals. The law began by distinguishing be-
tween mines and open-faced mines for which new laws were
established and quarries as to which no innovation was made.
The extraction of sand, chalk, building stone, and the like con-
tinued to be exploitable by the surface owers without complica-
tion. The only provision concerning these was that for public
works such as bridges, roads, and the like, these substances could
be exploited by the state by giving indemnification to the surface
owners for the value of the surface expropriated and the ma-
terials taken from the quarries or gravel pits. 8 This was clearly
enough an attribution of ownership of gravel pits and quarries
to the surface proprietors.
The regime established for mines and open-faced mines was
more complicated. The first article of the law of 1791 decreed:
"Mines and open faced mines, whether metallic or non-
metallic, such as asphalt, coal, and pyrite, are at the disposi-
tion of the nation, only in the sense that these substances
cannot be exploited without its consent and supervision with
the requirement of indemnification, according to rules to be
prescribed, of the proprietors of the surface, who will more-
over have the enjoyment of those mines which can be exploit-
ed eihter open faced or by pits and lights to the depth of 100
feet only."
'39
The regime established for mines and not that established
for quarries has become the law applicable to petroleum in
France. No mine could be exploited without the permission of
the state. This permission was termed a "concession"; and
while the surface owner did not have an absolute right to obtain
it, he did have a preference above all others.40 However, he was
required to show that he had the means to exploit the mine.41 If
the surface owner did not have the means to exploit the mine or
did not desire to exploit it, the concession could be given to some-
38. Law of 12-28 July, 1791, art. 2.
39. "Les mines et mini~res, tant mdtallique que non-mdtallique, ainsi que le
bitume, charbons de terre ou de pierre et pyrites, sont d la disposition de la
nation, Cn ce sens sculement que ces substances ne pourront 6tre exploitdes que
do son consentiment et sous sa surveillance, 4 la charge d'indemniser, d'apr~s les
rdgles qui seront prescrites, les propri~taires de la surface, qui jouront en outre
de celles de ces mines qui pourront tre exploitdes, ou a tranchde ouverte, ou avec
fo88e et lumi~re, jns qu'd cent pied de profondeur seulement."
40. "Les propidtaires de la surface auront toujours la pr~fdrence et la libertd
d'exploiter les mines qui pourraient se trouver dans leur fonds et la permission
ne pourra leur en dtre refusd lorsqu'ils la demanderont." Id. art. 3.
41. Law of 12-28 July, 1791, art. 11.
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one else,4 but not until the surface owner had been given six
months' notice.43 If there was a delay of more than six months
in beginning the exploitation after a concession had been grant-
ed, unless the state granted an extension, the concession would
be lost.44 Similarly, concessions could be lost by an unauthorized
work stoppage of more than one year.
45
The first article of the law of 1791 provided an indemnifica-
tion to the surface owner if someone else obtained a concession
to minerals beneath his land. The indemnification was estab-
lished at twice the value of the surface taken, but with no indem-
nification for the minerals extracted.
One can see that in passing the law of 1791 the French gov-
ernment wanted to assure the utilization of natural resources -
thus the possibility of giving a concession to another if the sur-
face owner did not exploit minerals in his land. But a frank
solution of the problem of ownership of minerals was not made.
The right of preference and the right of double indemnity recog-
nized to the surface owner was not in accord with the ideas of
Mirabeau that the state should own its mineral wealth. Yet, on
the other hand, the absence of indemnification for minerals ex-
tracted was a recognition that the landowner's right of owner-
ship was not perfect. Exploitation could not be undertaken with-
out a concession from the state, but the concession was not a
recognition of a right of ownership in the state. The state was
the conduit by which the right of exploitation that the surface
owner had not exercised was given to another. There is no pro-
vision in the law that the state was to be paid for the concession.
Despite the several limitations shown, the right of the sur-
face owner under the law of 1791 remained paramount.46 The
most important limitation to his rights of ownership was the loss
42. "Si le propridtaire superficiaire ne le demande pas elle pouvait dtre octroyge
a un autre."
43. Id. art. 10.
44. Id. art. 14.
45. Id. art. 15.
46. See 1 PLANIOL no 3095: "[I1t even gave him (the surface owner) a right
of preference over all others to obtain this permission, when he asked for it.
The right of the nation thus became purely nominal because it fragmented the
ownership of mineral deposits. The Civil Code further aggravated the situation
by recognizing to the landowners a limitless right."
"[O]n lui donnait mdme un droit de prdfdrence sur tous les autres pour obtenir
cette permission, quand it la demanderait. Le droit reconnu 4 la Nation devenait
ainsi purement nominal, parce qu'il morcelait la proprid&d des gisemente miniers.
Le Code civil avait encore aggrav6 la situation en reconnaissant aux propridtaires
un droit sans limitd."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of the jus prohibendi, the right to do nothing with his resources
and prohibit others from exploiting them.
Article 552 of the Code Napoleon (Article 505 of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code) provides that the proprietor of the surface owns
everything beneath the surface, subject to the modifications
made in the law of mines. Thus, the Civil Code is subordinated
to the previously existing mineral code. Despite this subordina-
tion, Planiol comments that the rights given the landowner in
Article 552 of the Code Napoleon weakened the already feeble
rights given to the state by the law of 1791 and aggravated the
problems caused by multiple ownership of mineral veins. 47 One
can see that the Code reinforced those who were opposed to gov-
ernment ownership of minerals by resolving the ambiguity left
in the law of 1791 in favor of private ownership of minerals by
the surface owner. Since Article 552 provided that ownership
of the surface carries with it the ownership of all above and be-
low, the surface proprietor is the proprietor of the minerals be-
neath his land, but they are "at the disposition of the nation
only in the sense that these substances cannot be exploited with-
out the consent of the nation and without its supervision. ' 48 The
best explanation of the relationship between the Code Napoleon
and the law of 1791 is perhaps that given by Portalis in his
presentation of the articles of the Civil Code on ownership to
the legislative body:
"We have presented the principle that ownership of the
surface carries with it the ownership of all above and below
it... one can understand that this ownership would be im-
perfect if the owner were not free to put to his profit all of
the parts both exterior and interior of the land or estate
which belongs to him, and if he were not the master of all
the space that his domain encloses ... however, as there are
rights of property of such a nature that private interest may
easily and frequently find itself in opposition to the general
interest and the manner of using these properties, laws and
regulations have been made to direct their usage. Such are
the domains which consist of mines, forest, and of similar
things, which have in all times been the subject of the atten-
tion of the legislature.
'49
47. Ibid.
48. Law of 12-28 July, 1791, art. 1.
49. "Nous avons pos6 le principe que la proprit6 du 8ol emporte le propridt
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One may imagine that the redactors were hesitant to make
provisions concerning ownership of minerals in the Civil Code
because of the almost certain conflict with laws of a public na-
ture outside of the Civil Code. Perhaps it is because of this that
one finds in the Code Napoleon only two references to mineral
law, even including in that term the law of open-faced mines and
quarries: Article 552 and Article 559 (which concerns the right
of usufructuaries to opened mines).
France was at war and Napoleon feared that private owner-
ship of minerals was hindering their exploitation. Thus, shortly
after the Civil Code had reinforced the rights given landowners
under the law of 1791, a governmental commission was appoint-
ed to study the desirability of writing a new mineral law. The
Committee reported: "The opinion of your commission, sirs, is
that it (the ownership of mines) should appertain to the state." 50
But Napoleon wanted to preserve at least in form the rights
given the surface owner by Article 552 of the Code. At the same
time he wanted to assure intervention of the state to obtain the
maximum production of mines. The legal solution proposed to
reconcile these two conflicting principles was his own. It was
that "the discovery of a mine gives birth to a new property; an
act of the sovereign thus becomes necessary for him who has
made the discovery to be able to profit by it." ' '51 This idea formed
the basis of the new mineral law of 1810,52 which in its princi-
ples and in many of its details is in vigor today and is applicable
to questions of petroleum.
The law of 1810 preserved the tripartite division of mines,
open-faced mines, and quarries, and provided a new and detailed
regulation only for mines. A concession was no longer principal-
ly an administrative authorization for the landowner to exploit
du dessus et du dessous . . . on comprend que la propridid serait imparfaite 8i le
propridtaire n'dtait libre de mettre d profit pour son usage toutes 1e8 partes
ectrieures et int4rieures du sol on du fonds qui lui appartient, et s'i n'6tait le
maitre de tout l'espace que son domaine renferme . . . . Cependant, comme il
est des propridtds d'une telle nature que l'intdrdt partiulier veut se trouver facile-
ment et frd quemment en opposition avec l'intdrdt gindral dans la manidre d'user
de ces propritds, on a fait des lois et riglements pour en diriger l'usage. Tels sont
les domaine8 qui consistent en mines, en fordts, et en d'autres objets parail8, et
qui ont dans tous les temps fix6 l'attention du hdgislateur." 2 FENET, RECUEIL
COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 124 (1836).
50. "L'opinion de votre Commission, Messieurs, est qu'elle (la propridtd des
mines) doit appartenir 4 L'Etat." FEHR at 23.
51. "La ddcouverte d'une mine fait naitre une propridt6 nouvelle; un acre du
sourverain devient donc ndcessaire pour que celui qui a fait la d~couverte puisse
en profiter." FEHR at 24, n. 1.
52. Law of April 21, 1810.
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his land. Since the discovery of a mine created a new property,
the surface owner had no right of preference whatsoever to ob-
tain a concession. 3 The state had the right to cede the new prop-
erty to whomever it found most capable of exploiting it. 4 The
concession was made by the state in perpetuity and gratuitous-
ly.55 The surface owner, without any priority to the concession,
was without power to prevent its being granted even for a period
of six months and, thus, was also without power to contract with
anyone to exploit the minerals for him. Under this law, the dis-
covery of minerals on one's land could very well be disconcert-
ing rather than a subject of joy.
The law of 1810, in changing the character of a concession to
exploit minerals and in creating a legal institution not known in
the Civil Code, wisely provided the legal effect of an act of con-
cession. The concession created a new, immovable property or
estate, 56 which was separate from the superficial estate.5 7 This
new property was capable of being sold or mortgaged by the con-
cessionaire: "as any other good.""" It follows that a sale or
mortgage of the surface did not carry with it a sale or mortgage
of the concession.
The law of 1791 contained no provisions concerning the right
to search for minerals. If the landowner did not wish to look for
minerals no one could make him do so. But since the landowner
was given a right of preference to the concession if minerals
were found, he had a reason to search for minerals. Under the
law of 1810 this reason was taken away. Thus, of necessity, the
law of 1810 established a regime of exploration under which the
surface owner had the right to explore his land for minerals
without permission from the state, or to sell this right of ex-
ploration to another but, if neither he nor anyone working with
his permission explored the land, anyone wishing to search for
minerals could obtain a permit of exploration from the state even
against the landowner's wish, but with the requirement that he
indemnify him in advance for any damages that might be done
to the surface.59
The provision for indemnification at twice the value of the
53. Id. art. 15.
54. Id. art. 16.
55. Id. art. 7.
56. Id. art. 8.
57. Id. art. 19.
58. Id. art. 7: "Comme tout autre bien."
59. Id. art. 10.
[Vol. XXIII
1963] LANDOWNER'S RIGHTS TO PETROLEUM 745
land taken, found in the law of 1791, was preserved and elab-
orated in the law of 1810. The concessionaire has the right to
utilize all of the surface area that he finds necessary for his ex-
ploitation of the subsurface. If this occupation lasts less than a
year, the concessionaire must pay the landowner twice the value
of the net profit that the land would have produced during the
time occupied.0 If the occupation is prolonged more than a year
or if the terrain, after the execution of the works required by
the occupation is no longer proper for cultivation, the landowner
can require that the concessionaire purchase the land from him
at twice its value before its occupation by the concessionaire. 1
At this point it would appear that the law of 1810 took from
the surface owner any rights he may have had to minerals be-
neath his land and left him only the right to be well indemnified
for the loss of the use of the surface. In practice, this was near-
ly true but, to avoid an open conflict with the rights given the
surface owner in Article 552 of the Civil Code, Napoleon insist-
ed that, in addition to indemnification for the loss of his surface,
the surface owner should receive from the concessionaire indem-
nification for the minerals extracted.62 This indemnification,
which would certainly indicate that the surface owner has a pro-
prietary interest in the minerals beneath his land, was known
as the redevance trgfonci~re or subsurface royalty. The royalty
was fixed in the act of concession but at a figure so low that it
had no real connection with the value of the minerals taken from
the land. Moreover, it was most often calculated at a set figure
per hectare per year and not by the quantity or the value of the
mineral extracted.6 3 This created in the law of 1810 an irrecon-
cilable contradiction. If the surface owner had a right to indem-
nification for the minerals taken, why was this right not for a
realistic indemnification? If he had no right to indemnification
at all, if the discovery of a mine really created a new property to
be disposed of by the state, why was he given any royalty?
Moreover, with a fictitious royalty and no preference to a con-
cession the subsurface rights given to the landowner in one
phrase of Article 552 of the Code Napoleon were effectually
taken away in the next.
The legal nature of the subsurface royalty is unique. It is
60. Id. art. 43.
61. Id. art. 44.
62. Id. art. 6.
63. FEIR at 28; ISAY, LE DROIT MINIER DES PRINCIPAUX ATATS CIVILISES
85 (French translation 1930).
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classified as a real right that the lower estate owes to the upper
estate. On this subject Planiol remarked:
"It offers remarkable characteristics: It is inseparable
from the surface property, except by the act of the owner; it
is included in a mortgage of the surface; it is seized and sold
with it. Moreover, it is perpetual, although it is no longer
permitted in the modern law to create perpetual rents. It is
thus a veritable example of a rente fonci~re, the only one
which survives; but it is of a modern creation, and the old
law did not know it."04
Between 1810 and 1919, the French government, without re-
quiring payment for the concession, began to exact a tax from
the concessionaire in the nature of a royalty which became more
and more onerous.6 5 Administrative changes slowly came about
but a hundred years passed before there was a major change in
the mineral law. This change came in 1919 when, at the end of
the First World War, the law of 1810 was modified in respect to
mines opened after the passage of the new law. The concession
under the new law was granted contractually by the state to the
mining company offering to pay the most. The duration of the
concession was limited and, at its termination the mine passed
in full ownership to the state. Also, under the amendments of
1919, the state itself was authorized to undertake the exploita-
tion of mines. 66
The rights of the surface owner to minerals beneath his land
were not significantly changed, but the language of the 1919 act
justifies several theoretical observations. The new law used the
word "return" for the transfer of mines to the state at the end
of the concession.6 7 Since this presupposes prior state owner-
ship, it is in conformity with Napoleon's principle that the dis-
covery of a mine creates a new property which appertains to the
state until it is ceded by the state to another. An objection often
made to the law of 1791 and also to the law of 1810 was that the
state could, in effect, expropriate private land not for a public
64. 1 PLANIOL no 3102: "Elle offre des caractdres remarquables: elle est
insdparable du fonds, si ce n'est par la volont6 du propri~taire; elle est comprise
dans l'hypothdque du sol; elle est saisie et vendue avec lui. De plus, elle est
perpdtuelle, Iiien qu'il ne soit plus permis, dans le droit moderne, de crder des
rentes perpdtue~les. C'est done un vdritable examvle de rente foncire, le suel
qui survive: mais il e8t de crdation moderne, et le droit ancienn l'a vas connu."
65. FEHR at 32, 36.
66. Law of September 9, 1919. See FEHR at 36.
67. Law of September 9, 1919, art. 1 : "reviendront."
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usage but to give it to another private person. Under the law of
1919, since the mine at the end of the concession would belong
to the state, this objection became less valid. But if the surface
owner is considered as having any right to the minerals there is
still an expropriation without sufficient indemnification. The
law of 1919 classified the right of the concessionaire as a "real
immovable right susceptible of mortgage," thus, as in the law of
1810, a separate estate.6 8 But, inasmuch as the concession was
no longer perpetual, it was difficult to consider the concession-
aire as the owner of a separate estate.6 9
After the changes of 1919, a petroleum law began to be cre-
ated apart from the ordinary mineral law. Petroleum had long
been exploited in Alsace but not by modern methods, and the law
of mines had been applied to the exploitation without special
legislation.70 It was after the First World War when a system-
atic search for petroleum in the south of France and in Aqui-
taine was begun that the first legislation pertaining uniquely to
petroleum exploration and exploitation was passed. This was
the law of December 16, 1922. Without doubt the most funda-
mental effect of the law was to classify petroleum as a mineral,
the exploitation of which required a concession from the state.
The rights of landowners to petroleum became the same rights,
extremely limited, clear in practice, irreconcilable in principle
with the Civil Code, and internally inconsistent, that had been
applied to solid minerals. The petroleum law of 1922 also estab-
lished a new institution which was essential to the development
of petroleum in France - the exclusive permit for exploration. 71
This permit granted a right to explore and guaranteed the ex-
plorer the right to exploit any deposits he found. Such a permit
would not be essential in the development of solid minerals
where the great expense is in exploiting not prospecting; but in
the petroleum industry the greatest expense is in prospecting,
for the only effective way to search for oil is to drill a well.
Without a guarantee of the right to benefit from a discovery of
petroleum, one could not be expected to undertake the expenses
of exploration.
The exclusive permit for exploration, important as it is to
the petroleum industry, does not in any way alter the rights of
68. Id. art. 4: "Droit rdel immobilidr 8usceptible de'hypothoque."
69. See 1 PLANIOL no 3805.
70. See note 31 supra.
71. Law of December 16, 1922, art. 2.
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the surface owner to the petroleum beneath his soil. His rights
to petroleum are the same as to any solid mineral subject to the
regime of concession.
Other provisions relating to petroleum were passed in 1929,72
and 1938,73 but also without any real effect on the rights left to
the proprietor of the surface. In 1956, all the mineral legisla-
tion was organized into a single mineral code,7 4 again without
important modification to the rights of surface proprietors. The
mineral code did, however, serve to organize the various min-
eral laws and to integrate the petroleum legislation.
LEGAL TECHNIQUES FOR THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION
OF PETROLEUM IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, the surface owner has the right personally to
prospect for petroleum and produce it. More often, however, he
will lease this right to an oil company for a share of production.
He may also sell his right either for a consideration in dollars
or a royalty on future production.
As previously pointed out, the sale of petroleum or the sale
of land with a reservation of petroleum is held to create a servi-
tude on the land in favor of the person purchasing or keeping
the mineral rights. The servitude may be limited in any manner
the parties to it stipulate, except that the prescription of ten
years liberandi causa cannot be avoided. 75 Ordinarily, however,
the "sale" or "reservation" of minerals does not provide operat-
ing stipulations and its effect is left to the courts for interpre-
tation. The rights of the holder of a mineral servitude are now
fairly well established. The holder of the servitude has the ex-
clusive right to drill for petroleum on the property subjected to
the servitude and may drill his wells wherever he wishes, lim-
ited only by the conservation laws.7 6 He may use the land for
the exploration and exploitation of minerals without indemnifi-
cation to the surface owner for damages he might cause the sur-
face. His only duty in this regard is not to damage needlessly
72. Law of December 1, 1929. The disposition of an exclusive permit for
exploration by act entre vifs was subordinated to a prior authorization by the
Minister in charge of mines.
73. Decree Law of June 17, 1938, which provided in detail the obligations
and rights of the holder of an exclusive permit for exploration.
74. Decree of August 16, 1956, modified and completed by the law of December
29, 1956, the decree of November 28, 1958, and the ordinance of December 10,
1958.
75. Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940).
76. Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries, 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933).
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the property of the surface owner. 77 The servitude owner alone
has the right to protect the petroleum deposits under the land
on which he has a servitude if a neighboring proprietor drills
a well and begins to drain the lands subjected to the servitude.
All the production of every petroleum deposit found in the land
subjected to his servitude belongs to the holder of the servitude,
subject to whatever royalties he may have contracted to pay the
landowner. The right to partake of the production of neighbor-
ing wells under a unitization agreement is his.
A mineral servitude is terminated by ten years non-usage
despite any convention to the contrary.78 To effect usage, the
servitude holder must either produce petroleum or drill a well
to a depth indicating a serious search for petroleum.7 9 A servi-
tude is considered a single servitude if it is made in a single
act of sale and affects one contiguous property; since servitudes
are indivisible, drilling one well on the entire property every ten
years will hold the servitude.0
The most common method of production is for the surface
owner or the holder of a mineral servitude to lease the rights of
exploration and exploitation to an oil company. For many years,
a purported mineral lease was considered as establishing a min-
eral servitude,8 ' but since the case of Gulf Refining Co. v. Glas-
sell,82 the two institutions have largely been kept separate. A
mineral lease is a contract between a landowner or servitude
holder and an oil company or broker, and the parties are free
to write such terms as they see fit.83 The obligations undertaken
by a lessee are habitually more stringent than those of the hold-
er of a servitude. It is an implied condition of every lease that
the lessee will test every part of the land subject to it with rea-
sonable diligence, or suffer a partial cancellation of the lease.8 4
77. Wemple v. Pasadena Petroleum Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So. 230 (1920).
78. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 167 La. 847, 120 So.
389 (1929).
79. Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931)
Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923) ; Baker v. Texas Co., 88 So. 2d
263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
80. Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
81. See Arent v. Hunter, 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157 (1931) ; Rives v. Gulf
Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
82. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
83. Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 81 So. 2d 389 (1955).
84. Middleton v. California Co., 237 La. 1039, 112 So. 2d 704 (1959) ; Wier
v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So. 2d 1 (1955) ; Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La.
139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
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Further, it is production and not simply the drilling of the well
that holds a mineral lease.85
A chain of legislation, limited by strict judicial interpreta-
tion, has attempted to classify the mineral lease as a real right."
The result has been that the mineral lessee has the procedural
remedies afforded the holder of a real right, but in no other sense
is the lease considered a real right.8 7 As is the case with the
holder of a mineral servitude, the lessee has the right to partici-
pate in any distribution under the Conservation Act."
Customarily, a mineral lease provides three sorts of revenue
for the lessor. He is given a bonus by the lessee for making the
lease. He receives a small rental during the "primary term" of
the lease, that is, during the period before drilling is commenced.
When and if petroleum is found, the lessor receives a portion of
the production from the well (usually 1/8th, but sometimes as
much as 1/4th) without obligation to contribute to the expenses
of exploration or exploitation. The remaining portion goes to
the lessee for his expenses and profits.
The possible duration of a mineral lease is not well estab-
lished in Louisiana law. If there is production, it is clear that
the lease lasts as long as production and for a certain time there-
after, which is usually established in the lease itself.8 9 How long
a lease may be maintained without production or how long it
may be maintained after production has ceased is less clear.
The argument has been made that the principle of the Frost-
Johnson case is not just that a sale of minerals creates a servi-
tude which prescribes in ten years, but the broader concept that
any right to petroleum should not remain separated from the
ownership of the land for more than ten years without being
exercised °
Reagan v. Murphy clearly holds that the articles of the Civil
85. Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 81 So. 2d 389 (1955).
86. La. Acts 1938, No. 205; Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336
(1940); LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950); Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d
210 (1958).
87. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958). See also Yian-
nopuilos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part 1, 23 LA. L. Ruv.
161, 199 (1963).
88. See, e.g., Louisiana Gas Lands v. Burrow, 197 La. 275, 1 So. 2d 518
(1941).
89. Sam George Fur Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipeline Co., 177 La. 284,
148 So. 51 (1933).
90. See DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 154 (rev. ed. 1949). See
also the dissent of Judge Tate in Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 543, 105 So. 2d
210, 215 (1958).
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Code pertaining to the prescription of real rights are inappli-
cable to leases. However, in the Reagan case, there had been
production on some of the land subject to the lease and whether
a clause in a lease could provide for the preservation of the
mineral rights for more than ten years without production may
still be open to some uncertainty.
When a servitude or lease terminates, the full right to explore
for and exploit petroleum returns to the person who is then
proprietor of the surface.
LEGAL TECHNIQUES FOR THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION
OF PETROLEUM IN FRANCE
The general law of mines, and the law pertaining exclusively
to petroleum, are incorporated in the French Mineral Code of
1956. The concession, limited in duration and granted contractu-
ally by the state to the petroleum company that shows itself
most able to do the work and offers the highest royalty to the
state, is the fundamental legal institution for the exploitation
of petroleum in France. Exploration is ordinarily accomplished
through the exclusive permit for exploration which in the Code
of 1956 is called the "Permit H" (for hydro-carbon).g' A permit
for exploitation, which is a limited concession, was established
in 1927,92 and has also been retained in the new Mineral Code.9 8
A "Permit H" gives to its holder "the right to effectuate
within its perimeter works for exploration, notably by geo-
physical prospection or drilling, to the exclusion of all other
persons, including the owners of the surface. '94 The permit is
granted by decree of the Conseil d'Etat for a duration of five
years and can be renewed twice, but at the cost of reducing
the perimeter by half.9 5 The half that must be released may be
chosen by the permissionaire. The "Permit H" carries with it
the absolute right to obtain a concession. Thus, no one can
obtain a "Permit H" without first showing that he has both the
technical and financial capacity successfully to carry on the
exploration and exploit the territory if petroleum is discovered.
The prospective permissionaire must present to the state a pro-
gram of development which he intends to follow. He must also
show the minimum financial resource that he intends to con-
91. MINERAL CODE OF 1956, art. 9.
92. Law of June 28, 1927.
93. MINERAL CODE OF 1956, art. 21.
94. Id. art. 9.
95. Id. art. 10.
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secrate to the project. Similarly, he must obligate himself to
request a title of exploitation which may be either a permit for
exploitation or a concession if he finds an exploitable petroleum
deposit. 96
The juridicial nature of the "Permit H" is not entirely clear.
Its holder may transfer it contractually in whole or in part,
but the transaction is valid only if it is ratified by the state
within six months after the transfer.97 There are no provisions
in the Code as to whether the permit is heritable or whether. it
is subject to seizure. Reasoning by analogy, it would appear
that it is both hereditary and capable of being seized, but the
rights of the new recipient would be dependent upon ratifica-
tion by the state. The question of heritability would seldom
arise, because the permit is usually given to a corporation.
A situation in which a permit could be seized can easily be
imagined, but its occurrence would be somewhat limited by
the power of the Conseil d'Etat to annul a permit if there is any
default in the execution of its terms.9 8
The nature of a concession has already been considered and
it is not necessary to go over it again in detail. The Mineral
Code provides that the extent of a concession is determined by
the act creating itY9 It is limited by a perimeter defined on the
surface and vertical lines indefinitely prolonged in depth tangent
to the perimeter. 10° A concession for petroleum production is
limited to fifty years.10 A cahier des charges, or pamphlet con-
taining the conditions of the concession, is made part of each
concession and largely conforms with a standard cahier des
charges established by the government for the exploitation of
petroleum. The entire cahier des charges, particularly the pro-
visions as to the royalty due the government, is subject to nego-
tiation. However, the royalty due the landowner, the "redevance
trfonci~re," is established in the standard cahier des charges
96. Id. art. 14.
97. Id. art. 17.
98. Id. art. 15.
99. Id. art. 28.
100. Ibid.
101. Id. art. 29: "The duration of concessions of liquid or gaseous hydro-
carbons is limited to fifty years. The duration of concessions of other substances
is without limit." ("La durie des concessions d'hydrocarbons liquides ou gazeus
est limitde a cinquante ans. La durde des concessions d'autreS substances est
illimitde.") There is some doubt as to whether the second phrase was intended
as a modification of the law of 1919 which limited concessions of all minerals or
if it simply declared that concessions issued before 1919 remained perpetual but
that others might be limited.
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published by the government, and is apparently not subject to
negotiation. 0 2
A permit for exploitation, as distinguished from a conces-
sion, only applies when the cumulative production of a reservoir
has not passed 300,000 barrels. 1 3 Once that measure is passed,
the holder of the permit must demand a concession, under which
his obligations will be more burdensome than they were under
the permit for exploitation. But a "redevance trdfoneire" for
the benefit of a landowner is payable in both.1°4 The maximum
duration of a permit for exploitation is five years, but it can
be twice prolonged five years.10 5 Oddly enough, the Mineral
Code provides that the permit for exploitation does not confer
on its holder any preference whatsoever in obtaining a conces-
sion.100 However, it would appear that a petroleum company
entering into exploration under a "Permit H" and then finding
a small reservoir and obtaining a permit for exploitation and
later increasing production beyond 300,000 barrels would cer-
tainly maintain the exclusive right to a concession granted by
the "Permit H."
The permit for exploitation is classified as an immovable
right, indivisible, not susceptible of being mortgaged, and in-
alienable by act entre vifs without the approval of the state. 10
In principle, nothing prevents the surface owner from ex-
ploring for petroleum under his land. His right to do so without
permission from the state is provided in Articles 7 and 8 of the
Mineral Code of 1956. But, if he makes such explorations with-
out having obtained a "Permit H," and if he has the luck to find
oil or gas, no law guarantees that he will be given a concession
and, thus, the benefit of his efforts. The surface owner as a
practical matter must apply for a "Permit H" as any stranger
would, and without any preference for obtaining it.108
Since the royalty owed the surface owner is computed by
surface area and is not dependent on the amount of production
102. Id. art. 30.
103. Id. art. 61.
104. Id. art. 56.
105. Id. art. 53.
106. Id. art. 60.
107. Id. arts. 55-58.
108. Thus, in French law whether a person is owner, usufructuary, naked
owner, or a stranger to a tract of land has no bearing on his rights to minerals
subject to concession. To find an analogy in French law to these and other
problems of Louisiana mineral law, it is necessary to look to the French law
concerning minerals not subject to concession, gravel pits, and the like.
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or even whether there is production, the problem of the division
of the production of a common pool between numerous surface
owners or lessees should not arise. But it is entirely pos-
sible that this problem could arise between two concessionaries
of contiguous concessions overlying a common pool. A solution
has not been envisaged by the Mineral Code.
It is necessary to remember, in speaking of questions of
petroleum law in France, that the government itself operates
several petroleum companies. 09 The Aquitainian Oil Fields,
the greatest oil producing region in metropolitan France, have
been exclusively exploited by the state. The Mineral Code con-
tains a provision that Aquitainian oil is reserved to the state
"to the exclusion of all other persons either physical or corporate
there including the proprietors of the surface."' 110
COMPARISON OF THE Two SYSTEMS AND CRITIQUE
The most obvious difference between the landowner's right
to petroleum under Louisiana law and under French law is
that under Louisiana law he is the true beneficiary of the petro-
leum found under his land, while under French law he is not.
Insofar as the rights of landowners are concerned the petro-
leum law of Louisiana resembles the French law of quarries
and other mineral exploitations not subjected to the system of
concession, but not French petroleum law."' The French petro-
109. Bureau de Recherce de Petrol, etc.
110. MINERAL CODE OF 1956, art. 197.
111. The French courts, like the courts of Louisiana, in regard to minerals
not subject to concession have found it difficult to determine if a sale or a lease
of minerals is a partial alienation of the soil creating a separate estate or only a
right to extract minerals. In France, according to Planiol: "It is admitted that
the sale of minerals is a sort of sale of movables or of a future thing. No text
of the code has provided this hypothesis.
"The jurisprudence considers the session of a right of extraction as a sale of
immovables, at least in regard to third persons, and requires that the sale be re-
corded . . . this is a solution difficult to justify. Certain decisions go so far as
to say that there is a partial alienation of the soil ... but this conception is hardly
defensible because a diminution in the value or the mass of a tract of land is not
an alienation of a part of the right to the land." See PLANIOL no 2684.
The jurisprudence referred to is based on a decision of the Court of Appeals
of Montpelier, October 23, 1922, D.1923.2.97.
"[T]he session of a right to exploit the minerals enclosed in a parcel of land
constitutes in the first place a session of an immovable, comporting a partial
alienation of the soil."
Ripert criticized this case. (Note Ripert S.1923.2.1.) : "It does not appear
possible to us to say that there is a partial alienation of the soil, because material-
ly the session does not affect the soil, but certain mineral veins, which can be
separated one from the other by bands of soil, and because juridically, this tem-
porary right comporting a determinate usage of the tract of land, hardly resembles
a right of ownership. In reality the purchaser of minerals has in view, not the
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leum law, despite its formal recognition of the rights of the
surface proprietor to minerals, resembles above all the systems
by which American governments, federal or state, exploit petro-
leum found on lands forming part of the public domain. That
is to say, one pays the state for permission to explore for petro-
leum, one gives the state a royalty on all petroleum found and
is obliged to develop the land properly or lose the concession
or lease.1 1 2 The role of the surface owner in French mineral
law is reduced to insignificance.
The subject matter of a law, without dictating the solutions
to be provided, does, to some extent, dictate the problems to
be resolved. Thus it is not surprising to find certain similarities
in French and Louisiana petroleum law. Although less apparent
than the differences these similarities should not be ignored,
especially as they point to basic issues of petroleum law.
Both French and Louisiana petroleum laws concern three
parties: the proprietor of the surface, the exploiter, and the
state. The laws must concern the proprietor of the surface
because exploration for petroleum and its exploitation require
the occupation of some superficial area and the superficial
owner should at least be reimbursed for the loss of the use of
his land. Moreover, in jurisdictions with private law based on
either the civil law or the common law, the right of the surface
owner to the products of his soil is at some point recognized.
Thus, a petroleum law in such a jurisdiction should in some
fashion regulate the rights of the proprietor of the surface to
the products extracted from his soil, as well as the use of the
surface.
Someone must do the work of exploration and exploitation
and, because of the costliness and difficulty of the work in-
land itself, but the materials that may be extracted from it, and it is for this
reason that the sale of these materials has been classified as a sale of movables,
a classification which it is useful to respect.
"We thus see only one possible explanation: The granting of a right to extract
minerals constitutes a lease of the immovable, accompanied by a sale of future
products . . . a sale of the right to extract minerals necessarily confers on its
purchaser a certain right of usage of the land from which the minerals are taken.
This session thus can be considered as importing a lease of a part of the im-
movable, surface or subsurface."
That the sale of minerals does not establish a servitude is shown by de Loynes
in his Note on another case: "[T]he contract is not the constitution of a servitude
for one does not there encounter a charge imposed on one estate to the profit of
another such as is required by Article 686 of the Civil Code." Aix, 18 April 1907,
under Reg. 23, May 1909, D.1910.1.489, note of de Loynes.
112. See 30 U.S.C. §§221(i)-236(a) (1940); LA. R.S. 30:121-36 (1950).
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volved, it will usually be done by an expert. It is possible that
this work be done by the government of the nation involved. In
America this has not been done; in France it has. But, and this
is recognized in both countries, there are established petroleum
companies so well equipped to explore for and produce petro-
leum that inadequate exploitation would be risked if their serv-
ices were not engaged.
Both laws concern the state for at least two reasons. A
petroleum reservoir usually surpasses the boundaries of any
one surface proprietor and bad management of petroleum de-
velopment by one surface owner can uselessly limit the quantity
of petroleum that can be extracted by the other owners, or
increase the expense of extraction. Thus, it is natural that there
should be either penal or administrative laws to regulate the
methods of production. Inasmuch as great expertise is required
in even estimating the limits of a pool and the best method of
production may vary from one reservoir to another, depending
upon its structure, the most logical method of insuring proper
development of these reservoirs may be through an administra-
tive body. The second reason is, of course, the extreme im-
portance of petroleum to the economic and military power of a
nation.
The French and Louisiana mineral laws also resemble each
other in providing systems that encourage the rapid discovery
of petroleum reservoirs. This aim can be achieved by providing
a profit for the exploiter or by direct exploration and exploita-
tion by the state. In Louisiana, exploration is encouraged by
recognizing the surface owner's right to the petroleum beneath
his soil. Since he can profit from the discovery of petroleum,
it is to his advantage to engage oil companies to search for oil
on his land. The oil company, in turn, having the possibility of
an immense profit if a good reservoir is discovered, will pay
the surface proprietor well for his rights either in cash or in a
percentage of production. Thus, the surface owner and the oil
companies are both encouraged to search for petroleum, and
the function of the government is, above all, to see that the
search and the consequent production are made in an orderly
fashion and without too much waste.
In France, as in America, the discovery of new petroleum
deposits is encouraged by providing a profit for the petroleum
company. This profit, however, is divided with the state and
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not with the surface proprietor who, without any right to real
benefit from the production of petroleum on his land, does not
interest himself in the exploitation of petroleum. Thus it is
necessary to have laws which force the surface owner to permit
others to enter his land and explore for and exploit petroleum.
Another principle common to both laws is that the explorer
is assured the right to benefit from his discovery. Otherwise,
why should he risk the capital necessary to explore for petro-
leum? This assurance is less important in matters of traditional
mines where less expense is involved in exploration, but it is
essential in petroleum law. Thus, we find the "Permit H" in
French law which guarantees to its holder the right to exploit
any petroleum deposit he finds. In Louisiana, the same right
is granted the lessee or servitude holder.
